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Introduction 
This thesis examines New Zealand's relations with Japan during the 1950s, and their 
development from the conditions of war, to a state of relative normalcy. Particular 
emphasis has been given to developments in the area of trade, and the factors that 
influenced New Zealand's policy in the area. The wider time frame dates from about 
1947, with the establishment of New Zealand's first representation in Tokyo, to New 
Zealand's acceptance of a full GATT trading relationship with Japan in 1962. Within 
this frame, the thesis is centred on two sets of trade negotiations between New 
Zealand and Japan. That in 1954 failed for a variety of reasons. The second, in 1958, 
succeeded, due to significant changes in the factors that had influenced the 1954 talks. 
There is a variety of secondary literature dealing with New Zealand-Japan relations in 
the twentieth century, and enough division of opinion and variance in argument to 
warrant further investigation. Tom Larkin was the first author to deal substantively 
with the topic, and provides an overview of post war relations to 1968, though not 
dealing with the specific details of the period 1954-1958. Larkin argued that there 
was a degree of enthusiasm on New Zealand's part to improve relations with Japan, 
stating there was a 'clear desire on both sides for closer ties', 1 and that each country 
' ... consciously sought to draw near the other. . .' 2 Larkin suggested that fear of 
resurgent Japanese militarism partially determined New Zealand's attitude to the 
process of making peace with Japan, but that in 1951 the country was ' ... probably 
even more sensitive to the possibility of danger of from the communist world ... ', and 
the danger of Japan coming into the communist orbit.3 However, after this early 
preoccupation with the political, Larkin argues that economic growth and trade 
opportunities were ' .. . principally responsible for the transformation of relations, and 
the vast expansion of contacts .. .' 4 Larkin's argument was that New Zealand's 
motives for improving relations with Japan in the early 1950s were political, but later 
1 Tom Larkin, New Zealand and Japan in the Post War World, Wellington: New Zealand Institute of 
International Affairs, 1969, p. 8. 
2 Ibid., p. 13. Larkin later commented that the period 1951-61 was marked' .. . most of all, by a positive 
decision on New Zealand's part to commit itself to the pursuit of friendly relations with Japan.' 
Larkin, 'The Place, Directions and Future Needs of New Zealand Relations with Japan', in New 
Zealand & Japan - The Papers of the Sixteenth Foreign Policy School University of Otago 1981, 
Dunedin: University of Otago, 1981, p. 90. 
3 Ibid., p. 6. 
4 Ibid., p. 7. 
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in the 1950s became economic. Nearly all subsequent work by other authors accepts 
this 'two periods' argument, albeit with chronological deviations. The idea is also 
referred to as determining New Zealand's external relations more generally, by two 
former Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Sir George Laking, and Graham Ansell. 5 
Ann Trotter also suggested that in the early 1950s New Zealand's attitudes were 
security centred, based upon fear of resurgent militarism in Japan. 6 Trade was of little 
importance during this time, Trotter said, although the building blocks for later 
improvements were laid. 7 Trotter agreed with Larkin that the 1950s heralded a phase 
of new relations after a period of post-war limbo, not without setbacks, but with 
general enthusiasm on New Zealand's part. She stated, for example, that trade with 
Japan grew in 1952, ' ... despite psychological and commercial obstacles'. 8 Trotter 
blamed the failure of New Zealand's 1954 trade negotiations with Japan on pressure 
from Britain, and a looming election that caused the Government to decide 'caution' 
would prevail. 9 The eventual success of the 1958 negotiations Trotter ascribed 
largely to New Zealand's increasingly unstable economic position, both in relation to 
short-term balance of payments problems, and long-term issues of reliance on the 
British market. 10 Trotter accepted the division of the 1950s into two periods, and 
stated that by 1956 ' ... security from Japan had ceased to be the significant issue', 
replaced by an emphasis on economics and trade. 11 
John Singleton disputed Trotter's proposition that New Zealand enthusiastically 
improved its relations with Japan during the 1950s, arguing instead that the change 
5 Sir George Laking, 'George Laking', in An Eye, an Ear, and a Voice, Malcolm Templeton (ed.), 
Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993, p. 51 and Graham Ansell, 'Graham Anse!J', in ibid., 
p. 152. The idea of two distinct 'political' and 'economic' periods, or policies, is also referred to by 
Keith Jackson, New 'Zealand Foreign Policy, paper delivered at the University of Otago Fourth 
Residential School on Foreign Policy, May 1969, p. 1. 
6 Ann Trotter, New 'Zealand and Japan 1945-52 - The Occupation and the Peace Treaty, London: 
Athlone Press, 1990, p. 3. Malcolm McKinnon makes the same argument, based on Trotter's work, 
stating that 'Through the post-war years New Zealand's diplomats and politicians sought to ensure 
that Japan did not return to a position where it could make war in the Pacific.' McKinnon, 
Independence and Foreign Policy - New 'Zealand in the World Since 1935, Auckland: AUP, 1993, 
p. 52. 
7 Trotter, New 'Zealand and Japan 1945-52, p. 183. 
8 Ann Trotter, 'From Suspicion to Growing Partnership: New Zealand and Japan', in New 'Zealand in 
World Affairs, Malcolm McKinnon (ed.), Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 
1991 ,p. 
9 Ibid., p. 202. 
10 Ibid., p. 205-206. 
11 Ibid., p. 204. 
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was a 'regrettable necessity', as New Zealand's British market became less 
accessible. In the short term, balance of payments and specific commodity issues 
forced a slow approach to Japan in order to be conciliatory to Britain. 12 Thus the 
1954 negotiations failed, Singleton said, largely due to New Zealand's desire to 
protect domestic industry and 'appease' Britain. Caution, Singleton stated, ' . .. would 
be Wellington' s watchword' .13 Other obstacles to closer ties were New Zealand's 
balance of payments problems, and Japanese inflexibility over concessions in 
agricultural products. 14 In the long term, however, New Zealand had no choice but to 
diversify her markets, after failing to extract concessions from Britain. Thus the 
successful 1958 negotiations were, Singleton suggested, due to the Government then 
being more anxious about the economy. 15 
David Horsley accepted the two periods assessment, but argued more strongly than 
others that domestic political factors, mainly the need to safeguard domestic industry, 
dominated relations in the early 1950s. 16 Horsley emphasised the other dimension of 
the security factor, that of the fear of Japan turning communist, and the role this 
played in driving the Government to consider closer links with Japan. 17 More so than 
others, Horsley argued that the Government's perception of public opinion played a 
large role in determining the course of relations over the whole of the period.18 
Horsley assessed the 1954 failure as being due largely to a change of policy by the 
12 John Singleton, 'New Zealand' s Economic Relations with Japan in the 1950s', Australian Economic 
History Review, March 1997 (37:1), p. 2. Ian McGibbon takes a similar line, stating that 'The 
Japanese were not to be trusted. No reliance would be placed upon their promises of good faith or 
peaceful intentions.' McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War Volume I - Politics and 
Diplomacy, Auckland: Oxford University Press, in association with the Historical Branch, 
Department of Internal Affairs, 1992, p. 22 McGibbon also deals with this in relation to the 'two 
periods' argument - that New Zealand got closer to Japan in the early 1950s out of political fears, 
and in the later 1950s out of fear of Japan economically. Ian McGibbon, 'New Zealand Perceptions 
of Japan 1945-1965', in Japan and New Zealand 150 Years, Roger Peren (ed.), Palmerston North: 
The New Zealand Centre for Japanese Studies, Massey University, Palmerston North, on behalf of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo in Association with the Historical Branch, Department of 
Internal Affairs, 1999, p. 135. 
13 Ibid., p. 5. Singleton makes the similar arguments about British influence in 'New Zealand, Britain 
and the Survival of the Ottawa Agreement 1945-77', Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
43:2, 1997, p. 171. 
14 Singleton, 'New Zealand' s Economic Relations with Japan', p. 2. 
15 Ibid., p. 9. 
16 David W. Horsley, 'New Zealand and Japan Trade Relations 1928-1958', MA Thesis in History, 
University of Canterbury, 1990, p. 178. 
17 Ibid., p. 189. 
18 Ibid.,p. 135. 
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Japanese government, and New Zealand's domestic considerations. 19 By 1958, New 
Zealand's economic difficulties were such, said Horsley, that a trade agreement with 
Japan was almost a necessity.20 
Barry Mccaul argued that fear of resurgent Japanese militarism was central to 
Government attitudes until the mid- l 950s, 21 and that from 1954 onwards, economics 
became central to the relationship. 22 In this, McCaul followed the two periods line, 
but took a position between Trotter and Singleton on the issue of 'enthusiasm' for 
Japan, and stated that the Government changed from a negative policy ' ... that 
regarded closer relations and trade with Japan as a duty rather than a worthwhile goal 
in its own right',23 to a positive policy that ' .. . recognised that Japan could offer much 
to the world'. 24 Mccaul' s thesis was written before departmental files were available 
and thus treats the specifics of 1954 and 1958 superficially. He did assert, however, 
that 1954 failed because 'Other markets existed for New Zealand, and the then present 
pattern of trade with Japan was satisfactory. ' 25 The 1958 success McCaul attributed 
to the new Labour Government becoming 'convinced Japan was a friend', 26 and of the 
potential value of the Japanese market. 27 
Sharon Harvey addressed the 'third dimension', or cultural sphere, of New Zealand-
Japan post-war relations.28 Harvey's central concern is the failure of New Zealanders 
to develop the cultural and linguistic skills to deal with the Japanese, despite the 
increasing importance of the relationship since the 1950s. 29 Because New Zealand in 
the 1950s and afterwards possessed little understanding of the Japanese, when 
19 Ibid., p. 188. Leslie Castle, an officer of the Department of External Affairs at the time, and an 
important figure in formulating economic policy towards Japan, stated that negotiations fai led due to 
'bitter opposition from some quarters in New Zealand', referring to the actions of manufacturers 
opposed to increased trade with Japan. L.V. Castle & I. McDougall, Japan as a Market for New 
'Zealand Exports of Meat and Dairy Products, Research Paper No. 14, New Zealand Insti tute of 
Economic Research, 1969, p. 8. 
20 Ibid., p. 209. 
21 Barry Quentin McCaul, 'New Zealand and Japan 1952 to 1969 - An Assessment of New Zealand 
Government Attitudes' , MA Thesis in Political Science, University of Canterbury, 1970, p. 24. 
22 Ibid., p. 158. 
23 Ibid., p. 57. 
24 Ibid., p. 157. 
25 Ibid., p. 61. 
26 Ibid., p. 43. 
27 Ibid., p. 69. 
28 The first and second dimensions being economics and politics, respectively. 
29 Sharon Harvey, 'The Third Dimension - Cultural Relations between New Zealand and Japan in the 
Post-War Period', MA Thesis in History, University of Auckland, 1988, ii. 
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problems with Japan arose, New Zealand was poorly equipped to deal with them. 30 
Harvey endorsed the two periods approach,31 and emphasised the role of economics 
as a motive for improving relations.32 Harvey implied that New Zealand's diplomatic 
efforts were directed towards a short term interest in economics, rather than in the 
consideration of long term political and cultural links. 33 Such an attitude intersects 
with Singleton's argument that any 'enthusiasm' for Japan was illusory. The 
Government, Harvey said, failed to anticipate the long term importance of Japan to 
New Zealand economically, and were unwilling to see Japan as 'different' from other 
trading partners. 34 However, Harvey concluded by saying that the lack of cultural 
understanding did not hinder developments in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as trade 
was then limited, and political issues were addressed multilaterally rather than 
bilaterally. 35 
This research explores a number of issues and questions emerging from these authors. 
Some earlier conclusions have been borne out here, but others now appear less valid 
than previously. A key question of this research was New Zealand's motivation for 
the improving links between 1947 and 1962. The argument that the 1950s can, 
generally, be divided into two periods, one political and one economic, still seems 
valid. However, it seems there was rarely any balance between political and 
economic motives. The political predominated almost completely until about 1956, 
and the economic came to the fore thereafter. 
There is inconsistency in existing work over the extent to which the political 
motivation centred on security from Japanese militarism, or fear of Japan turning 
communist. Authors have, for example, been unable to decide whether ANZUS was 
more the result of fear of Japan militarism, or fear of Communism. McCaul and 
Trotter lean towards militarism, Singleton and Horsley towards Communism.36 
30 Ibid., p. 30. 
31 Ibid., p. 18. 
32 Ibid., p. 2. 
33 Ibid., p. 8 & 18. 
34 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
35 Ibid., p. 246. 
36 A variety of others take either position, sometimes both. Ian McGibbon argues that Japanese 
capacity for rearmament, 'perhaps impelled by a desire for revenge was not discounted; and most 
New Zealanders were unprepared to rely for protection upon geographical isolation alone.' 
McGibbon, 'The Defence of New Zealand 1945-57', in New 'Zealand in World Affairs Vol I, F.L.W. 
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Larkin's comment that the movement between the two was a 'smooth and 
imperceptible shift of position', is apt, given the difficulties in drawing any definitive 
division. 37 But there was an increasing fear that Japan might turn communist, 
especially under the influence of trade with communist China. A larger Allied policy 
of ensuring Japanese prosperity through diverting her trade to Western countries 
developed, and New Zealand felt she ought to do her part by increasing trade with 
Japan. 
Over the whole period, fears of the 'Red Menace' outweighed fears of the 'Yellow 
Peril', and this communism argument was essentially the Government's sole 
motivation during the 1954 negotiations. Yet this argument was based on a somewhat 
shallow rhetoric, and difficulties during the negotiations revealed a fundamental split 
in the official advice the Government received. Fear of communism was in the end 
not enough to secure agreement. There were a variety of reasons for this. 
This thesis argues that the explanations of British pressure advanced by Trotter, 
Singleton and Horsley are over-stated. This is not to say such considerations did not 
influence the Government at all, but that British policy was so inconsistent and so 
opposed by some high-level officials, that its real influence on the decision may be 
questioned. Horsley' s explanation of a change in Japanese policy only tells part of 
the story. The suggestion by Trotter and Singleton that 'caution' prevailed obscures 
the fact that the New Zealand's indecisiveness effectively wrecked the agreement 
long before the Japanese changed their policy. This thesis maintains that the 
hesitancy was linked overwhelmingly to government fears of the effects of increased 
Japanese competition on domestic industry, and a related concern about possible 
public criticism of agreement with Japan. These factors have not been given the 
emphasis they warrant. 
Wood (ed.), Wellington: Price Milburn for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 19XX, 
p. 45 . Elsewhere he similarly states that the capacity of Japan to ' ... rapidly restore its offensive 
power perhaps impelled by a desire for revenge was not discounted.' McGibbon, New Zealand and 
the Korean War Volume, p. 22. David Mcintyre agrees that ANZUS was a 'guarantee' given to New 
Zealand for its support of a 'soft' peace with Japan, but also that 'the wider context' was provided by 
the Cold War. Mcintyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact- Policy-Making, Strategy, and Diplomacy, 
1945-55, Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 1995, p . 1. See also Mcintyre, 'From Dual 
Dependency to Nuclear Free', in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2"d edn, Geoffrey Rice (ed.), 
Auckland: OUP, 1992, p. 528. 
37 Larkin, New Zealand and Japan in the Post War World, p. 6. 
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Several other factors were involved that have received minimal coverage previously. 
The divide in opinion between departments played a crucial role in causing the 
Government to hesitate, and there were long-term issues affecting the roles of the 
departments concerned that have not been explored. The 1954 process was also 
hindered by the inexperience of both parties in dealing with each other, and to some 
extent New Zealand' s lack of expertise in Japanese methods of operation. This 
resulted in occasional misunderstandings and confusion that did not help the progress 
of negotiations. 
Additionally, existing literature mentions to differing degrees the influence of other 
Commonwealth countries on New Zealand's policy. However, this discussion is 
confined to Australia's influence in 1958. In 1954 New Zealand was influenced to a 
considerable extent by the actions of not only Australia, then in a similar position to 
New Zealand, but also Canada, whose successful agreement with Japan made them a 
more relevant example. Other research has also shown that in the early 1950s 
Australia was actually influenced by New Zealand's approach to Japan, which 
supports, at least to some degree, the 'enthusiasm' suggested by Larkin and Trotter. 
Many of these factors began to change after 1954. The communism argument was 
discredited, and ceased to be of much significance. In its place trade for its own sake 
was now the motive for further links with Japan. Trade between the two countries 
increased between 1954 and 1958, meaning New Zealand had the incentive of 
protecting a small but profitable niche, and a potentially greatly expanded market, 
from Japanese pressure_ and Australian competition. This became increasingly 
important as developments in Europe meant that the British market could no longer be 
taken for granted. Therefore in 1958 New Zealand had a more compelling motive to 
reach an agreement. 
The other factors that had adversely affected the 1954 negotiations had also changed 
by now. Advice from officials was no longer split, making a cohesive policy much 
easier to pursue. Britain again pressured New Zealand, but was largely ignored. 
Concerns over domestic industry and public opinion were again in evidence, but had 
lessened to the degree where even a Labour government, traditionally suspicious of 
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increased trade with Japan, moved forward with a trade agreement. Influence from 
other Commonwealth countries was again prominent, but this time Canada took a 
back seat as New Zealand observed Australia's successful trade agreement with 
Japan. Between 1954 and 1958 New Zealand had also developed greater experience 
in dealing with Japan, helped considerably by visits by Japanese politicians to New 
Zealand, and vice versa. In 1958 there was no confusion or misunderstandings. As a 
result of all these factors, the process moved more smoothly towards a successful 
conclusion. 
Various sources have been used in this research. At Archives New Zealand, a number 
of files from the Departments of External Affairs, (EA) Industries and Commerce, 
(IC) and others have been have been used, covering a range of issues from trade 
negotiations, to state visits and wider political issues. At the Alexander Turnbull 
Library the personal papers of a number of persons important to the development of 
relations have been used. The papers of Alister Mcintosh, Secretary of External 
Affairs for the entire period covered, have been useful. Correspondence between 
Mcintosh and officers in New Zealand and abroad, especially those in Japan, was 
particularly helpful in identifying background issues not recorded in departmental 
files . Interviews with several people involved in the development of New Zealand-
Japan relations, both in Wellington and Tokyo, have been conducted. These have 
given insights into some of the trends in the paper record, as well as illuminating 
others. 
